Abstract: We examine some basic data on the evolution of aggregate short interest, both during the dot-com era, and at other times in history. Total short interest moves in a countercyclical fashion. For example, short interest in NASDAQ stocks actually declines as the NASDAQ index approaches its peak. Moreover, this decline does not seem to reflect a substitution away from outright short-selling and towards put options, as the ratio of put-to-call volume displays the same countercyclical tendency. The evidence suggests that: i) arbitrageurs are reluctant to bet against aggregate mispricings; and ii) short-selling does not play a particularly helpful role in stabilizing the overall stock market.
1
The spectacular rise and fall of stock prices during the recent dot-com bubble period has been accompanied by a surge of interest in the topic of short-selling. For the most part, this work is cross-sectional in nature, examining the causes and consequences of short-sales constraints at the individual-stock level, and it suggests the following two broad conclusions. First, consistent with the notion that short-selling is undertaken by rational arbitrageurs, the demand for short positions is greatest among stocks that appear to be overvalued-e.g., stocks that have high ratios of prices to book value. Second, because of frictions in the market for borrowing stock, as well as various institutional rigidities, arbitrage by would-be short-sellers is incomplete. Thus those stocks where the demand for shorting is greatest (as measured, say, by a high premium paid to borrow the stock for the purposes of short-selling) tend to have abnormally low future returns. 1 Less attention has been paid to variation over time in aggregate short interest, and to the role that this might have in countering market-wide sentiment. Casual intuition might suggest that short-selling-based arbitrage would be more effective along the aggregate dimension than it is in the cross-section. After all, while it can be difficult at any point in time to short a minority of very overpriced stocks, most stocks are easily and cheaply shorted. Moreover, there are other ways to get a short bet down on the aggregate market-for example, by purchasing put options on various indices.
It turns out that this intuition is off the mark. We examine some basic data on the evolution of aggregate short interest, both during the dot-com era, and at other times in history. In a striking contrast to the patterns seen in the cross-section, total short interest moves in a countercyclical fashion. For example, short interest in NASDAQ stocks actually declines as the NASDAQ index approaches its peak. Moreover, this decline does not seem to reflect a substitution away from outright short-selling and towards put options: the ratio of put-to-call volume displays the same countercyclical tendency. As we discuss below, the evidence is perhaps most consistent with Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1997) , who argue that the open-end nature of most professional arbitrage firms (i.e., the fact that investors can withdraw their funds on demand) makes it difficult for these firms to buck aggregate mispricings. The evidence also suggests that shortselling does not play a particularly helpful role in stabilizing the overall stock market.
I. The Data

A. The Dot-Com Bubble
Figure 1 tells our basic story for the dot-com period. We plot three series on a monthly basis over the interval 1995-2002: i) the NASDAQ index (CRSP's total return index); ii) the value-weighted short-interest ratio (100 times the market value of shares sold short, divided by the value of shares outstanding) for all NASDAQ companies; and iii) the 60-day moving average of the Chicago Board Options Exchange's (CBOE) daily put-call ratio. The put-call ratio is the total CBOE trading volume in puts-including both index options as well as options on individual NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX stocks-divided by the volume in calls, and we use it as an admittedly noisy proxy for the magnitude of shorting done via options. This ratio averaged about 0.7 during the period; we have multiplied it by four in the figure so as to fit it on the same scale as the short-interest ratio.
As can be seen, both the short-interest ratio and the put-call ratio decline substantially as the NASDAQ index explodes upward from mid-1998 to its peak in March of 2000; they both then rebound sharply as the index collapses over the subsequent two years. Some simple statistics confirm the visual impressions from the figure. The return on the index over the prior twelve months has a correlation of -0.54 with the short-interest ratio; and a correlation of -0.63 with the put-call ratio. (The shortinterest ratio and the put-call ratio are themselves highly positively correlated, at 0.58, suggesting that these two measures are capturing similar information.)
Aside from these time-series patterns, it is also worth noting that remarkably little short-selling takes place at any point in the cycle. In the case of the NASDAQ, the shortinterest ratio averages 2.53 percent over our sample period, and never breaks four percent.
B. Short-Selling on the NYSE, 1960-2002
For a longer historical perspective, we examine NYSE data from 1960 to 2002.
Because of both data availability and institutional differences, we use an alternative measure of short-selling. One issue is that we have better data here on short-selling volume than open interest. A second is that on the NYSE, unlike the NASDAQ, a large fraction of shorting is due to specialists, who are engaged in high-frequency hedging. So the measure we use is total shares sold short by public investors (as opposed to by NYSE member firms) divided by total share volume, which we term the short-sales ratio, and which we can calculate on an annual basis.
The NYSE short-sales ratio trends sharply upwards during this period (rising from 1.2 percent in 1960 to 6.6 percent in 2002), perhaps reflecting the growing popularity of hedge funds and other long-short strategies. Thus we look at the change in the short-sales ratio. In Figure 2 , we plot this change against the annual return to the value-weighted NYSE stock index. The two series move strongly counter to one another-the correlation coefficient is -0.51, which is highly statistically significant. So overall, this longer stretch of history tells much the same story as Figure 1 does for the dot-com era. 
II. Implications
The evidence suggests that aggregate short interest displays extrapolative behavior-i.e., it looks like fewer investors are willing to bet on the market going down after a period in which it has been rising. But this characterization raises a puzzle.
Recall that at the individual-stock level, short interest appears to be contrarian in nature, with high-priced stocks attracting more attention from short-sellers. So why does the cross section of shorting seem to reflect the actions of rational arbitrageurs, while the aggregate time series seems to reflect the actions of naïve trend-chasers?
One potential answer has to do with the open-end nature of professional money management. Consider an example in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) . Suppose there are a set of hedge funds that specialize in short-selling. The managers of these funds are rational arbitrageurs, so at any point in time, they will use the capital they have to target a portfolio of the most overvalued companies-hence the pattern of shorting in the cross section. But when the market rises, the short-selling funds will lose money, and hence will face redemptions from their clients. These redemptions (i.e., the well-known "performance-flow" relationship) may have their roots in either rational updating about hedge-fund-manager ability, or in some degree of irrational trend-chasing on the part of end investors. But in either case, the result is that fund managers have less capital to work with in a rising market, and are forced to scale back their aggregate short positions.
The broad message is that because of the pervasiveness of open-ending, professional arbitrage may be even less effective at countering market-wide sentiment shocks than it is at enforcing rational pricing in the cross section. This can be true even though the most obvious direct impediments to arbitrage (e.g., individual stocks being hard to borrow) arise in the cross section. the degree of open-ending that we observe is one that serves investors well. Stein (2003) argues that competition among money managers for investors' dollars creates an externality, and can lead to a socially excessive amount of open-ending. When any one fund open-ends, it compromises its own ability to undertake certain kinds of arbitrage (which is both a private and social cost), but it makes itself more attractive to investors, and thereby steals business from other funds (which is a private, but not a social gain).
This general perspective on the constraints faced by professional money managers is helpful in thinking about the arbitrage role played by non-financial firms. In contrast to the behavior documented above, non-financials were, effectively, enormous shortsellers during the bubble period, via issues of their own shares-the dollar volume of initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings peaked at roughly the same time as the NASDAQ index. In rationalizing this fact, one probably does not want to take the position that non-financial managers are shrewder or better-informed than, e.g., hedgefund managers, particularly with respect to market-wide movements in prices. A more plausible explanation has to do with a comparative institutional advantage. A nonfinancial manager who issues equity at the time of a market peak does so in the closedend corporate form, and without being subject to mark-to-market accounting. So if the market continues to go up, she will not record a loss, and she will certainly not be faced with the threat of liquidation.
As a final point, our data shed some light on the tendency for short-sellers to come under political attack in the aftermath of large market declines. Jones and Lamont (2002) discuss the crackdown on short-selling after the crash of 1929, and note that numerous anti-shorting regulations stem from this period, including the uptick rule, as well as the Investment Company Act of 1940, which placed severe restrictions on the ability of mutual funds to go short. It is clear from Figures 1 and 2 that aggregate shortselling tends to increase in bear markets, which perhaps makes it all the easier for people to blame the messenger. However, according to our interpretation of this evidence, the problem is not too much short-selling in falling markets-recall that the aggregate volume of short interest is always quite small in absolute terms-but rather, too little in rising markets. If this view is correct, any regulatory efforts to constrain short-selling are likely to be misguided. 
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